Facilitation of PHA Studies using the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP), What-If, and Checklist methodologies, as appropriate for the complexity of the process being analyzed. The PHA evaluates the hazards and safeguards within the design to qualitatively evaluate the risks associated with the process.
Provide assistance to facilities throughout the safety lifecycle associated with managing Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) in accordance with IEC 61508/IEC 61511/ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004. Lifecycle services specifically offered include the risk assessment (HAZOP/LOPA), safety requirements specification (SRS) development, and SIL Verification services.
EPA Risk Management Plan (RMP) / OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) Support Services
Development, auditing, and updates of RMP/PSM Programs that include the following elements:
- Process Safety Information
- Process Hazard Analysis
- Operating Procedures
- Employee Participation
- Pre-Startup Safety Review
- Mechanical Integrity
- Hot Work Permit
- Management of Change
- Incident Investigation
- Emergency Planning and Response
- Compliance Audit
- Trade Secrets
Also, RMP includes an Offsite Consequence Analysis and Accident History. RMP/PSM Programs are required to be audited every three years and updated every five years in order to meet regulatory requirements.
Development of Emergency Response/Operations Plans for process facilities and municipalities. Plans include the use of the Incident Command System, hazard specific response procedures and flow charts, damage assessment checklists, reporting requirements, and additional emergency planning requirements. A training program is also developed including introductory training, tabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full scale exercises.
Facilitation of LOPA studies to assign Safety Integrity Level (SIL) targets for the Safety Instrumented Functions. The primary purpose of LOPA is to determine if there are sufficient layers of protection against an accident scenario (can the risk be tolerated?). A scenario may require one or more Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) depending on the process complexity and potential worst-case severity of a consequence. Note that for a given scenario, only one layer must work successfully for the consequence to be prevented. However, since no layer is completely reliable, sufficient protection layers must be provided to render the risk of the accident tolerable.
Titan engineering & Consulting, LLC